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LEITER TO PARTICIPANTS 
ur 
P.O. Box 14180 
Nashville. Tennessee 37202�180 
(615) 251-1401 
Welcome! We are pleased that you are participating in this training program sponsored 
by The University of Tennessee's Center for Government Training. You are to be 
commended for your interest in improving your job skills through continuing education. 
The field of local government is a challenging one. It requires current job knowledge and 
constant skill refinement in order to provide the public with the best service possible. This 
training will provide beneficial information and you will leave better equipped to meet the 
demands of your position. 
In addition to this course, the Center for Government Training offers a variety of programs 
and seminars throughout Tennessee for local and state government officials. Two certificate 
training programs form the key components of our local government training effort. These 
programs are designed specifically for county officials or municipal officials. I encourage 
you to learn more about these certificate training programs and to consider what they have 
to offer. Not only do the courses in these programs help to keep you informed about 
recent developments, increase your understanding of local government issues and sharpen 
your specific job skills, they also provide an opportunity to discuss issues and share ideas 
with other local government officials. 
The Center for Government Training stresses quality education and practical training to 
help you in your daily operations. In order to better serve your needs, we solicit your 
input. Your comments and suggestions are important to us. We also welcome your 
suggestions on topics for future courses. 
Our sincere appreciation is extended to Mr. Jim Murphy, Attorney for the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, who developed the material for 
today's course. 
Education is a life-long process. We applaud your efforts and your commitment to 
professional development. 
Sincerely" 
Patricia C. Davis 
Execu tive Director 
The Center for GOt'ernment Training ... an agenc: of UT's stateu.'ide public sen.'ice and continuing education organization 
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This course in the Municipal Officials' Certificate Train ing Program is 
designed to provide information regarding a broad range of legal issues 
which wil l  confront municipal officials. A large portion of the course wil l  deal 
with the legal foundations for municipal government, the structure of 
municipal governments in Tennessee, the powers vested in  municipal 
governments and the methods for exercising those municipal powers. This 
course wi l l  also review the basic qual ifications for municipal officials as 
establ ished by state law and ethical considerations for municipal officia.ls .  
Th is course wil l  review issues which confront municipal officials frequently 
such as public access to municipal records, open meetings of municipal 
officials, personnel matters and the l iabi l ity of municipal ities and mun icipal 
officials under state and federal law. 
Lea rning Objectiv es 
Goals 
1. Provide municipal officials with 
a basic knowledge of the legal 
fo undat ions of mun ic ipa l  
government and operations. 
2. Provide municipal officials with 
a basic knowledge of the legal 
restr ict i o n s  u n der  wh ich  
municipal governments operate. 
3. Provide municipal officials with 
a basic knowledge of legal 
requirements and restrictions 
appl icable to municipal officials. 
4 .  Provide municipal officials with 
a basic knowledge of current 
legal issues of concern to 
municipalities in general . 
1 
Obj ectives 
Help municipal officials recogn ize and 
respond to legal questions and 
problems that relate specifical ly to the 
legal existence, structure and 
organization peculiar to their respective 
municipal governments. 
Help municipal officials recogn ize and 
respond to restrictions that l imit 
contemplated municipal action (or 
inaction) in the ir respective mun icipal 
governments . 
Help municipal officials recognize, 
respond to or avoid legal restrictions 
applicable to municipal officials. 
Help municipal officials recogn ize and 
anticipate legal issues creating concern 
in their municipalities before they 
become problems in their respective 
municipal governments. 
.r 
II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
Constitution 
A municipality is a governmental entity created by the Tennessee General 
Assembly.1 Although the Tennessee Constitution does not specifically 
authorize the General Assembly to create municipalities, there is no doubt 
that such power exists.2 The General Assembly may vest a municipality 
with such authority as does not violate the federal or state constitutions.3 
Municipalities are subject to the control of the General Assembly which can, 
at its pleasure, provide for the creation or prohibition of a municipality, 
dictate the terms of a municipal charter and confer such powers and duties 
and impose such burdens and restrictions as are deemed expedient. 4\ 
Although the creation of municipalities is not expressly authorized, the 
language of Article I I, Section 29 closely indicates that the General Assembly 
has the power to establish municipal governments. Article I I , Section 29 
empowers the General Assembly to authorize municipalities to levy taxes, 
and prohibits municipalities from loaning their credit for private purposes, or 
from becoming stockholders as joint owner of any company, association or 
corporation for a private purpose without the approval of three-fourths of the 
voters. 
The legislature governs cities and towns through general laws which apply 
to all cities and towns (and sometimes only to all cities and towns within a 
certain class, such as all cities and towns of a certain population), and 
through private acts which apply only to particular cities and towns. Before 
Amendments 6 and 7 of the 1 953 Amendments to the Tennessee 
Constitution were adopted, the legislature could (and often did) pass private 
acts as well as general laws without consulting with or obtaining the 
approval of the affected cities and towns. Neither Amendment 6 nor 7 
disturbed the rights of the legislature to pass general laws, but did have a 
considerable impact on private acts. 
Amendment 6 to the 1 953 Amendments to the Tennessee Constitution 
altered the General Assembly's powers over local governments as follows: 
(1) Prevented private acts from becoming effective until they obtained 
approval by a two-thirds vote of the municipal (or county) governing 
body or by the majority of those voting in a referendum held for that 
purpose. The private act itself must specify by which of the two 
methods local approval can be obtained. 
(2) Prohibited entirely private acts "having the effect of removing the 
incumbent from any municipal or county office or abridging the term 
or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for which such 
2 
public officer is selected." Private acts call "Ripper Bills" had done 
those things in many cities and counties without local approval prior 
to 1953. 
Amendment 7 to the 1953 Amendments to the Tennessee Constitution, also 
known as the home role amendment, altered the powers of the General 
Assembly as fol lows: 
(1) Gave municipal ities the option of adopting home rule and provided 
that the legislature could pass no private act of any kind applying to 
home rule municipalities. Home rule cities or towns could then adopt 
and amend their own charters without the approval of the legislature. 
(2) Prohibited the further incorporation of private act cities and towns and 
restricted new incorporation of cities and towns to incorporation 
under existing or future general laws. 
However, Amendment 7 did not disturb the right of existing private act cities 
and towns to continue and amend their charters by private acts. 
Municipal Charters 
The General Assembly has provided for the incorporation of municipal ities 
by the adoption of private act charters (prior to 1953) and the adoption of 
general law charters . The charter of a municipal corporation is the 
constitution of the local government, granted by the General Assembly, and 
the powers granted thereby must be consistent with the Tennessee 
Constitution .5 
The General Assembly has approved four general act charters . These 
charters are found in the Tennessee Code Annotated as fo l lows: 
(1 ) Mayor-Aldermanic Charter (6-1-101 et seg.) 
(2) Un iform City Manager-Commission Charter (6-18- 1 01 et seg.) 
(3) Modified City Manager-Council Charter (6-30-101 et seg.) 
(4) MetropOl itan Government Charter (7-1-101 et seg.) 
Private act charters can be located by reference to the volumes of the 
Private Acts of Tennessee, which can be found in many law l ibraries in the 
State of Tennessee. All of the various private acts appl icable to the 
municipal ity must be consulted to ascertain the complete terms of any 
private act charter. 
Public or Private Acts 
As discussed above, the powers and duties of municipal ities are subject to 
the control of the General Assembly. By the adoption of publ ic acts, the 
General Assembly can vest whatever powers it deems appropriate upon 
3 
, 
municipalities of the state, or limit or eliminate any powers which were 
vested in municipalities by public act, private act or the charter of the 
municipality. 
The General Assembly is also authorized to adopt private acts applicable to 
any particular municipality , but, as discussed above, no such private act 
may take affect until it is approved by a vote of 2/3rds of the membership 
of the legislative body of the municipality, or approved by a majority of the 
votes in a referendum conducted to ascertain the wishes of the voters of the 
municipality . 
Since the General Assembly is authorized to adopt legislation which can 
alter the structure of a municipal government, careful reference to the 
Tennessee Code Annotated and the Private Acts of Tennessee applicable 
to a municipality must be consulted in order to ascertain the legal foundation 
of a municipality government. 
1 .  Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board v. Lively, 
692 S.W.2d 1 5  (Tenn. 1 985). 
2 .  19 Tennessee Jurisprudence, Municipal Corporations, Section 5 ,  p. 1 23 (1 985). 
3. Hol ly v. City of El izabethton, 1 93 Tenn.46, 241 S.W.2d 1 001  ( 1 951 ). 
4.  State v. Frost, 1 03 Tenn. 685, 54 S.W. 986 (1 900). 
5. East Tenn. University v. Mayor of Knoxville, 65 Tenn. 1 66  (1 873). 
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III. STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS 
Basic Forms of Municipal Government 
There are three basic forms of municipal government in the United States: 
(1) Mayor-Council 
(a) Strong mayor 
(b) Weak mayor 
(2) Commission 
(3) Council-Manager 
The mayor-council form of government must be further subdivided into the 
weak mayor type and the strong mayor type. Under the weak mayor type, 
the mayor is a weak mayor with few functions beyond that as the 
ceremonial head of the municipality and as the presiding officer of the 
council. Under the strong mayor type, the mayor has significant operational 
functions, including some or all of the following functions: employment and 
removal of personnel, budget preparation and execution, supervision and 
direction of employees, and veto power. Many mayors run for office without 
having learned beforehand whether the office of mayor is a strong or a 
weak mayor, and are surprised after taking office that their powers are 
extremely limited . 
The main characteristic of the commission form of government is that the 
members of the municipal legislative body are the heads of municipal 
departments. The mayor in the "commissionll form of government is usually 
selected by the commissioners from among their membership. 
The last basic form of municipal government is the council -manager form. 
The major feature of this form of municipal government is that a city 
manager appOinted by the city council is the chief administrative officer of 
the city. The city manager is directly responsible to the city council for the 
operation of the city, and the city manager, rather than the city council or 
the mayor, has the authority to appoint, supervise and remove all or most 
city employees and to conduct the daily affairs of the city. The mayor 
usually has no administrative or executive powers but serves as the 
ceremonial head of the city. 1 
Municipal Governments Under General Law Charters 
Mayor-Aldermanic. Under the general law mayor-aldermanic charter, the 
mayor is a weak mayor. The mayor's legislative authority is limited to the 
right to vote on all matters coming before the board of mayor and aldermen. 
The administrative authority and duties of the mayor include: 
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(1 )  Taking, information ,  recommendations and statements of the financial 
cond ition of the city before the board. 
(2) General supervision of al l municipal officers and the right to suspend 
any city officers for misconduct or dereliction of duty in office, 
provided that a report of such action ,  including the reasons for it, is 
submitted in writing to an immediate meeting of the board . 
(3) Making temporary appointments for administrative city officers in case 
of sickness, absence or other temporary d isabi l ity under such 
restrictions as the board may direct. 
(4) Cal l ing special meetings. 
(5) Acting as city judge (with jurisdiction concurrent with that of a 
sess ions court judge) . 
(6) CounterS igning all warrants drawn upon the treasury and municipal 
contracts . (6-1-406) 
The board of mayor and aldermen is the governing body of the municipal ity. 
As such , it is empowered to exercise the corporate powers of the 
municipal ity not expressly vested or set out in  the duties of some other 
official . The board of mayor and aldermen is required to read ordinances 
appropriating or receiving money or levying taxes on three separate days, 
passing the ordinance on third reading by a majority of the membership of 
the board , by cal l ing for a vote of aye or no. All other ordinances must be 
read on two separate days. All votes of aye or no on al l ordinances must 
be recorded. After an ord inance is adopted on final reading, a summary 
or caption of the ordinance must be published in a newspaper of general 
ci rcu lation . No ordinance shal l  take affect until this publication occurs. 
Also, al l ordinances must be codified at least once every ten years . 
(Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-1 02). 
The recorder is appointed by the board of mayor and aldermen. The 
charter does not expressly so provide; however ,  Tennessee Code 
Annotated Section 6-1-401 provides that the "officers of each municipal ity 
shall consist of a board of mayor and aldermen", and such offices as they 
may deem necessary for the proper admin istration of municipal affairs .  
These officers are to be  selected by the board of mayor and aldermen . 
The charter contains two direct references to the recorder. 
(1 ) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1 -406 provides that the mayor 
"shal l countersign all amounts drawn upon the treasurer by the 
recorder or secretary . . .  " 
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(2) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-403 provides that "The 
recorder or other properly designated officer shall be vested with 
concurrent jurisdiction with Judge of the Court of General Sessions, 
in all cases of violation of the criminal laws of the state, or of the 
ordinances of the municipality . . . " 
It is therefore apparent that the recorder is a position which must be 
established under the mayor-alderman charter. 
The recorder is subject to the ultimate control of the board of mayor and 
alderman under the mayor-aldermanic charter, but the mayor also is vested 
with the authority of the "general supervision of all officers of the 
municipality . . .  " Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406, this 
supervisory authority would include the general supervision of the recorder. 
The recorder can apparently be suspended by the mayor pursuant to 
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406 which gives the mayor the 
"power to suspend any city officer for misconduct or dereliction of duty in 
office .. .  " But note that the suspension is based on misconduct and 
dereliction in office. In addition, the same section provides that the mayor 
must report the suspension with the reason in writing to an immediate 
special meeting of the board. 
Although Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-1-406 provides that the 
mayor shall be vested with the powers of a justice of the peace (now a 
judge of general seSSions), Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-2-403 
provides that the recorder, or other properly designated officer shall be 
vested with concurrent jurisdiction with judges of general sessions in all 
cases involving the violation of criminal laws of the state or ordinances of the 
municipality. These provisions would therefore authorize the mayor or 
recorder to serve as the city judge to consider violations of the criminal laws 
of the state or ordinances of the municipality. 
In addition to the recorder, the charter implies that the municipality operating 
under the mayor-aldermanic charter must also have a treasurer. As with the 
recorder, the treasurer is appOinted by the board of mayor and aldermen. 
The treasurer is responsible for reporting to . the board of mayor and 
aldermen at every meeting as to the financial condition of the city, by 
providing an itemized accounting of receipts and disbursements, certifying 
the availability of funds to the board whenever an order or ordinance 
involving the expenditure of money or the creation of a debt shall be 
presented to the board of mayor and aldermen, setting aside funds to be 
used after any appropriation of money is made by the board of mayor and 
aldermen. (Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-2-301 and 6-2-307). 
Uniform City Manager. The uniform city manager general law charter is 
obviously a council-city manager form of municipal government. The mayor 
under the general law uniform city manager-commission charter is elected 
by the board of commissioners for a two year term (6-22-201). The mayor 
is the presiding officer of the board (6-20-209 and 6-20-213), and can call 
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special meetings of the board upon g iving each commissioner, the city 
manager, recorder, and city attorney twelve ( 1 2) hours written notice of the 
meeting (6-20-208) . The mayor has a vote on matters presented to the 
board, but no veto (6-20-21 3) .  Beyond that authority, the charter provides 
only that the mayor has the power and duty to "perform all acts that may be 
required by any ordinance duly enacted by the board of commissioners, not 
in  conflict with any of the provisions of the charterll (6-20-21 9) .  The mayor 
or any other commissioner or employee can be removed from office by the 
board of commissioners ''for crimes or misdemeanors in  office , for grave 
misconduct showing unfitness for publ ic duty, or for permanent disabi l ity, 
by a majority vote of the other members of the board voting for removal ."  
However, the removal must be accompanied by notice of charges and an 
opportunity for a hearing (6-20-220) . 
The city manager under the general law uniform city manager-commission 
charter, is the administrative head of the city, under the direction and 
supervision of the board of commissioners (6-2 1 - 1 07) . The authority and 
duties as administrative head of the city are as fol lows : 
( 1 )  To see that the laws and ord inances are enforced , and upon 
knowledge or information of any violation thereof, to see that 
prosecutions are instituted in the city court; 
(2) Except as is otherwise set out in the charter, to appoint and remove 
al l  heads of departments and subordinate officers and employees, all 
appointments to be made upon merit and fitness alone; 
(3) To supervise and control the work of the recorder, the chief of police, 
the city attorney, treasurer, and all other officers, and of all 
departments and divisions created by the charter or which are 
created by the board of commissioners; 
(4) To see that all terms and conditions imposed in favor of the city or 
its inhabitants in any publ ic uti l ity or franchise are faithfu l ly done, kept 
and performed, and, upon knowledge or information of any violation 
thereof, to cal l  the same to the attention of the city attorney; 
(5) To attend al l meetings of the board of commissioners, with the right 
to take part in the discussion , but not to vote; 
(6) To recommend to the board of commissioners for adoption such 
measures as the city manager may deem necessary or expedient; 
(7) To act as budget commissioner and to keep the board of 
commissioners fu l ly advised as to the financial condition and need of 
the city; 
(8) To act as purchasing agent for the city and to purchase all material , 
supplies and equipment for the proper conduct of the city's business. 
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The board of commissioners shall prescribe by ordinance the 
maximum expenditure which the city manager may make without 
specific authorization of the board , and shall prescribe rules for 
competitive bidding, but no purchase shal l be made at any one time 
in an amount which in the aggregate will exceed one thousand 
dollars ($ 1 ,000) , un less bids shall have been requested through 
advertisement and award made to the lowest bidder; and 
(9) To perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the charter 
or required of him by resolution or ordinance of the board of 
commissioners (6-2 1 -1 08) . 
The charter further provides that the city manager appoints the pol ice and 
fire chiefs and such other members of the pol ice and fire departments "as 
may be provided by ordinance" (6-2 1 -70 1 ) ,  and that the city manager may 
appoint or remove the recorder, chief of police,  treasurer, city attorney and 
all other officers, agents , and employees (6-2 1 - 1 02) . 
An additional element of the city manager's authority and duties is that he 
has the "fu l l  power to manage and control the public or the city schools 
(6-21 - 1 08) , and , in accordance with that authority and duty , has broad 
personnel power over the school superintendent and other school 
employees (6-2 1 -802) , and over the erection and maintenance of school 
bui ldings and the purchase of school equipment and suppl ies (6-21 -803 
and 6-21 -804) . 
The city manager is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of, the board 
of commissioners except that the city manager cannot be removed from 
office within  twelve months of appointment except for incompetence, 
malfeasance, nonperformance or neglect of duty . Removal with in twelve 
months g ives the city manager the right to demand written charges and a 
pub lic hearing prior to the removal (6-21 - 1 0 1 ) .  Th is twelve month protection 
was obviously designed to al low the city manager a period of time to 
operate the affairs of the municipality without threats of removal from the 
board of commissioner, who disapprove of the management activities of the 
city manager. 
The board of commissioners is the legislative body vested with the 
legislative powers and al l  other governmental powers of the municipal ity 
except as otherwise provided in the charter (6-20-205) . The board se lects 
the mayor who presides over the meetings of the board . The board also 
selects the vice mayor to act for the mayor when the mayor is absent or 
unable to act. The powers of the board must be exercised in  the sessions 
duly assembled , with the sessions open to the publ ic (6-20-206, 6-20-21 2) .  
A majority of all the members of the board shall constitute a quorum which 
is needed to take action by the board (6-20-2 1 0) .  Al l ordinances of the 
board must beg in with the phrase "Be it ordained by the city of as 
fol lows:", must be read on three different days and not less than one week 
shall e lapse between fi rst and third reading (6-20-21 4 , 6-20-21 5) .  All 
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ordinances except emergency ordinances shall not take effect until fifteen 
days after the first passage thereof. Emergency ordinances must contain 
a statement that an emergency exists and specify in detail the facts and 
reasons constituting the emergency, and shall be adopted only upon the 
unanimous vote of the board. An emergency ordinance shall take effect 
upon the day of its final passage (6-20-21 5) .  
The votes of the board on al l ordinances shall be by yeas and nays, with the 
vote of each member voting for or against an ordinance being entered into 
the journal (6-20-21 6) .  Each ordinance which is adopted shall be 
numbered, copied in an ordinance book and fi led and preserved by the 
recorder (6-20-21 7) .  Ordinances or a caption and summary thereof must 
be published in  a newspaper of general circulation in the municipal ity before 
they become effective (6-20-2 1 8) .  
Under the uniform city manager-commission charter, the recorder is 
appointed by the city manager and may be removed by the city manager 
at any t ime (6-2 1 - 1 0 1 ) .  The recorder may apparently be removed by the 
board of commissioners under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 
6-20-220 which provides that: 
The mayor or any commissioner or any employee may be removed from 
office by the board of commissioners for crime or misdemeanor in office, 
for grave misconduct showing unfitness for public duty, or for permanent 
disability by a majority vote of the other members of the board voting for 
such removal. 
However, removal under this section also g ives the accused certain 
elaborate rights including specific written charges and a hearing.  
The authority , duties and responsibi l ities of the city recorder under the 
uniform city manager-commission charter are principally contained in 
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-21 -401 through 6-21 -405. The 
recorder has a seat and voice ,  but no vote , on the board of commissioners, 
(6-21 -401 ) ,  heads the department of finance, (6-21 -401 ) ,  attends and keeps 
a record of all meetings of the board of commissioners, (6-21 -403) , has the 
custody of and preserves all municipal records (6-21 -404) and performs any 
of the duties imposed by the charter or by ordinance (6-21 -401 ) .  
The city manager has the authority to appoint the recorder as the treasurer 
(6-22-1 1 9) .  Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-22- 1 01 describes in 
explicit detai l the fiscal duties and responsibi l ities of the recorder as head of 
the department of finance. The work of the recorder is done under the 
supervision and control of the city manager (6-2 1 - 1 08) . In add ition , the 
recorder serves as city judge where the office has not been fi l led by the 
appointment of another person by the board of commissioners (6-2 1 -501 ) .  
I n  a few municipalities as identified by population classes, the city judge has 
jurisdiction concurrent with that of the courts of general sessions, and in  
these municipalities the city judge must be an attorney ,  must be appointed 
by the board of commissioners and serves at the wi l l  of the board 
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(6-21 -501 ).2 In the remaining municipalities, the city judge has jurisdiction 
only over those cases arising under municipal ordinances and laws. The 
qualifications for the city judge, if one is appointed by the board , must be 
specified in an ordinance adopted by the board . The duties of the city 
judge and the operation of the city court under the uniform city 
manager-commission charter are set out in considerable detai l in 
Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-21 -502 through 6-21 -508. 
The appointment of a city attorney is not expressly required under the 
un iform city manager-commission charter, however the charter does 
contemplate such an official , since Tennessee Code Annotated Section 
6-2 1 - 1 02 provides for the qualifications of the city attorney, and Tennessee 
Code Annotated Section 6-21 -202 provides for the duties of the city 
attorney.  The city attorney is under the supervision of the city manager, 
who can also remove the city attorney at any time (6-21 - 1 08, 6-21 - 1 02) . 
The uniform city manager-commission charter also provides for the 
establ ishment of a department of finance under the recorder (6-2 1 -40 1 ) ,  
and departments of publ ic safety, public works , welfare and education 
(6-21 -301 ) .  These departments and other departments as created by 
ordinance are under the supervision and control of the city manager 
(6-21 -302, 6-2 1 -303) . 
The charter also provides for the appointment by the city manager of a ch ief 
of pol ice and other members of the police force as are provided for by 
ordinance to perform the duties set out at Tennessee Code Annotated 
Section 6-2 1 -602 (6-2 1 -60 1 ). The city manager is required to appoint a 
ch ief of the fi re department and other members as may be provided by 
ordinance so as to prevent and su ppress fires (6-2 1 -70 1 , 6-21 -702) . The 
city manager must also appoint and establish the salary and duties of the 
superintendent of education and all teachers and other personnel of the 
department of education (6-2 1 -802) . The city manager is also authorized to 
appoint a treasurer, however the recorder may be appointed as treasurer 
(6-22- 1 1 9) . 
Mod if ied C ity Ma n ager-C ou n cil. As with the u n ifo rm 
city-manager-commissioner form, the modified city manager-counci l form of 
municipal government is a counCi l-manager form of government. 
The mayor under the modified city manager-council charter is elected by 
the council (6-32- 1 06) . The mayor is the ceremonial head of the city and 
signs ordinances and other city documents (6-32- 1 06) . The mayor also 
has the authority, as do the city manager and any of the council members, 
to call special meetings of the council (6-32-1 02) . However, the mayor 
"shal l  not have any regular administrative duties ,  and shall perform only 
such duties as shall be - specifical ly conferred or required by law. II 
(6-32-1 06) . 
The city manager is the administrative head of the city , responsible for 
carrying out the pol icies of the city council under the general law modified 
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city manager-council charter. The council must deal with the administrative 
officers and employees of the city solely through the city manager "except 
for the purpose of inquiry." In other words, the council cannot give orders 
to the city manager's subordinates or interfere with the city manager's 
administration of the city (6-35-703) . 
The city manager's specific authority and duties include: 
(1) Law enforcement and public safety and health (6-35-204) . 
(2) Purchasing (6-35-205) 
(3) Management of all city property (except school property). (6-35-301) 
(4) Collection of taxes (6-35-301) . 
(5) Administration of finances (6-35-302) . 
(6) Budget preparation and administration (6-35-304, 6-35-310) . 
(7) AppOintment, removal and supervision of all city personnel, subject 
to a merit system for which the city manager is also responsible 
(6-35-402, 6-35-406) . 
(8) Compensation of city officers and employees (6-35-407) . 
However, unlike the general law uniform city manager-commission charter, 
an elected school board, and not the city manager, is responsible for the 
operation of the school system (6-36-101) . The council elects the mayor 
and who presides over the meeting of the council (6-32-106) . The council 
also elects a mayor pro tem to act in the absence of the mayor 
(6-32-107) . The council must hold regular meetings twice monthly and may 
hold special meetings upon the request of the mayor, the city manager or 
any two council members (6-32-101, 6-32-102) . The council must exercise 
its powers only at public meetings (6-32-103) , and at least one half of the 
membership of the council constitutes a quorum necessary for the council 
to conduct business (6-32-104) . The council has the power to compel 
attendance at its meetings by council members or other city officials 
(6-32-105) . The affirmative vote at one-half of the membership of the 
council is necessary to appoint or remove any official, but any other action 
except for calling a special meeting or adjourning a meeting may be 
accomplished by a vote of a majority of those members present and 
constituting a quorum (6-32-108) . The vote on any proposed ordinance 
must be by yea or nay, with the vote of each council member entered into 
the journal which must be maintained for all proceedings of the council 
(6-32-108) . A summary of all proceedings of the council shall be published 
within fifteen days after the.. meeting in a newspaper of general circulation 
which has been designated as the official city newspaper (6-32-108, 
6-33-112) . The council 'is also authorized to subpoena and examine 
witnesses, order the production of books and papers, and punish witnesses 
for contempt (6-32-109) . 
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All regulatory or penal action, revenue measures, or other action required 
by the charter to be accomplished by ordinance, may only be accomplished 
by the adoption of an ordinance. The ordinance must encompass only one 
subject which shall be expressed in its title. The enacting clause of any 
ordinance must state: "Be it ordained by the Mayor and Councilmen of the 
City of (6-32-201). Other actions may be accomplished by motion 
or resolution. All ordinances, motions or resolutions considered by the 
council must be in written form prior to their introduction (6-32-201). 
All ordinances shall be read at two meetings not less than one week apart, 
and except for emergency ordinances, shall take effect ten days after the 
adoption. Emergency ordinances which contain a full statement of facts 
and reasons for the emergency, may be made effective upon their adoption 
if approved by a majority of the members of the council on two readings, on 
successive days. The title and brief summary of all ordinances except 
emergency ordinances must be published in the official city newspaper at 
least one week before final passage (6-32-202). Any ordinance granting a 
permit or right to use public property for any purpose or granting a 
franchise or exclusive contact must remain on file with the clerk for public 
inspection for at least two weeks prior to its final adoption (6-32-203). 
All ordinances must be maintained in the "ordinance book" by the clerk with 
a separate book for all resolutions, and at least an abstract of all essential 
proviSions of each ordinance shall be published in the official city 
newspaper within ten days of its adoption (6-32-204). Also, all ordinances 
must be codified within one year of the adoption of the charter and every 
ten years thereafter (6-32-205). 
There is no reference to a recorder in the modified city manager-council 
charter. However, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 6-35-401 provides 
that the city manager "shall" appoint a city clerk responsible for keeping and 
preserving the city seal, and all records of the council; attending meetings 
of the council and keeping a journal of proceedings at such meetings; 
preparing and certifying copies of official records in the clerk's office and 
performing all other duties as are prescribed by the council or city manager. 
The clerk may be removed by the city manager under Tennessee Code 
Annotated Section 6-35-402, but it must be done in accordance with the 
merit system outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-35-403 
through 6-35-411. 
The general law modified city manager-council charter requires that the city 
judge be a licensed attorney and be elected by popular vote for a four-year 
term. The city council fills vacancies in the office of city judge between 
elections. The city judge has jurisdiction concurrent with that of judges of 
courts of general session (6-33-102). While the city council "shall by 
ordinance establish and provide for the administration of a city court, II the 
city judge has broad personnel authority over the city court employees 
(6-33-102, 6-33-103). 
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The charter also requires the council to create a personnel advisory board 
and authorizes the creation of other such advisory boards, with the council 
to prescribe in each case the number of members, apPointment, length of 
term, and advisory duties of these boards (6-33-1 05) . The council is also 
required to establish a planning commission to exercise the authority in the 
fields of planning, zoning and subdivision control as set forth under the 
general laws of the state (6-33-1 06) . 
The council is also required to appoint a city attorney and such assistant 
city attorneys as the council determines to be required (6-33-1 1 3) .  The 
duties of the city attorney are set forth at Tennessee Code Annotated 
Section 6-33- 1 1 3 (b) . 
The charter also provides for the establishment of a three member 
equalization board by the council to review tax assessments made upon 
property within the city (6-34- 1 01 , 6-34-1 02) . 
Metropolitan Govern ment Charters 
The provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7- 1 -1 01 ,  et seg. , 
which authorize the creation of consolidated city-county governments into 
a metropolitan government, permit the charter commissioner which drafts 
the charter for the metropolitan government to set forth the appropriate 
structure for the metropolitan government (7-2- 1 0 1 ) .  The required 
components of the charter of such a metropolitan government are set forth 
at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 7-2-1 03.  
Mun icipa l Governments Under Private Act Charters 
It is difficult to speak with precision about the authority and duties of 
municipal officials under private act charter because each charter varies to 
some extent. For example, under some private act charters, the mayor is 
a strong mayor who exercises considerable administrative authority, 
including the veto power over ordinances. Under other private act charters, 
the mayor is a weak mayor whose only authority beyond that exercised by 
other city council members is the authority to preside over council meetings, 
act as the ceremonial head of the city and perhaps make temporary 
appointments to city offices . Even the city manager under some private act 
charters does not have all the authority traditional ly granted to city 
managers under most city manager-council forms of government, or the 
charter authorizes the city council to l imit or expand the authority of the city 
manager at its pleasure. Since each private act charter is a separate and 
distinct document, close scrutiny of the entire charter is necessary to deter­
mine the structure of the municipal ity created by such a private act charter. 
14 
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See Forms of Municipal Government (The Bureau of Publ ic Ad ministration, The 
University of Tennessee, Knoxvil le, October 1 973); Tennessee Municipal Hand book 
Fourth Edition (Municipal Technical Advisory Service, The University of Tennessee, 
1987) . 
See Summers v. Thompson, 764 S.W. 2d 1 82 (Tenn. 1988) . The Supreme Court 
held that only city judges who d id not exercise constitutional jud icial power served 
at the will of the board. 
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IV. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS 
Qualifications 
The general qual ification requirements for officeholders apply to municipal 
officeholders. These general qualifications permit the hold ing of office by all 
persons over the age of eighteen years' who are citizens of the United 
States and Tennessee, and who reside with in and are qualified voters of the 
state, county, district, or circuit for the period required by law, 2 are qualified 
to hold office, except : 
1 .  Those convicted of offering or g iving a bribe, or larceny, or any other 
offense declared infamous by law, unless those persons have been 
restored to citizenship;  
2 .  Those against whom there is an unpaid judgment for moneys 
received by them in an official capacity, due to the United States,  
Tennessee, or any county ;  
3 .  Those who are defau lters to the treasury at the time of election (such 
an election is vo id) ; 
4 .  Soldiers , seamen, marines, airmen , in the regular Un ited States Navy, 
Army , or Air Force ; and 
5 .  Members of Congress and persons holding any office of profit or 
trust under any foreign power, other state, or the United States. 
(8-1 8-1 01 ) 
A crime declared infamous by law is a felony, or a crime which is partial ly 
punishable by disenfranchisement ( loss of the right to vote) . Also , any 
person previously convicted of a misdemeanor in office (39-5-401 m �.) , 
is forever barred from holding office . Any disqualified person who takes 
office is gui lty of a misdemeanor. (8- 1 8- 1 02) 
I n  addition to these general qual ifications, municipal officials under the 
mayor-aldermanic charter must comply with the requirements of Tennessee 
Code Annotated Sections 6-1 -401 and 6-1 -402, municipal officials under the 
uniform city manager-commissioner charter must comply with the 
requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 6-20-1 0 1 , 6-20-1 03 
and 6-20- 1 04, and municipal officials under the modified city 
manager-counci l charter must comply with the requirements of Tennessee 
Code Annotated Sections 6.:.31 - 10 1  and 6-31 - 1 05. Municipal officials under 
the metropol itan government charter and private act charters must comply 
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with whatever qual ification requirements for municipal officeholders which 
are contained in those charters. 
Bribery for Votes. It is unlawful for any candidate for the election to a 
municipal office to expend, pay, promise, loan , or become pecuniari ly l iable 
in any way for money or any other thing of value, either di rectly or indirectly, 
or to agree to enter into any contract with any person to vote for or support 
any particular policy or measure, in consideration of the vote or support, 
moral or financial , of such person (2-1 9-1 21 ) .  This is the prohibition against 
bribery for votes (2-1 9-1 26) . However, this does not render it i l legal to 
make expenditures to employ clerks or stenographers in a campaign, for 
printing and advertising,  for actual travel expenses, or for certain other 
al lowed expenditures (2-1 9-1 24) . Voters l ikewise are prohibited from 
accepting bribes, and betting on elections is also prohibited (2-1 9-1 29 
through 2- 1 9- 1 3 1 ) .  There are also prohibitions on bribery for votes found 
in the uniform city manager-commission charter, (6-20- 1 08) and the 
modified city manager-counci l charter (6-3 1 - 1  09) . 
In  a case involving whether the district attorney abused his d iscretion in 
refusing to bring a quo warranto proceeding against the Mayor of 
Nashvi l le-Davidson County as requested by an unsuccessful candidate for 
that office,3 the Tennessee Supreme Court considered the question of 
bribery in violation of the bribery statutes and Article 1 0 , Section 3 of the 
Tennessee Constitution , which states :  
Any elector who shall receive any gift or  reward for his vote, in meat, drink, 
money or otherwise, shall suffer such punishment as the law shall direct. 
And any person who shall directly or indirectly give, promise or bestow any 
such reward to be elected, shall thereby be rendered incapable, for six 
years, to serve in the office for which he was elected, and be subject to 
such further punishment as the Legislature shall direct. 
The allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the Mayor involved distribution 
of free cheese and butter to low income groups through the Metropol itan 
Development and Housing Agency, and a barbecue and watermelon feast 
sponsored by the Mayor's re-election committee. 
In  rejecting the bribery claim,  the Supreme Court held : 
A quo warranto proceeding is not maintainable at the instance of a private 
citizen. (citation omitted). However, if the District Attorney should act 
arbitrarily or capriciously or should be guilty of a palpable abuse of his 
discretion in declining to bring such action or in authorizing its institution, 
the Courts will take jurisdiction upon relation of a private citizen, in the 
name of the State of Tennessee. '  (citation omitted). The burden of proof 
Is on the party having the affirmative of an issue and this burden never 
shifts. (citation omitted). The burden of proving that the District Attorney 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously or was guilty of palpable abuse in 
declining to proceed is upon the private citizen who seeks to rectify the 
alleged public wrong without approval of the District Attorney General. 
The prohibition of the Constitution and the statute involved here is directed 
to the giving or promising of rewards such as meat, drink, money, or things 
of value for a vote to be elected to public office. Ms. Anderson and her 
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attorney did not provide the District Attorney with a single instance wherein 
it was factually asserted that Mayor Fulton had given anything of value in 
exchange for a promise to vote for him in the Mayoral election. Implicit In 
the District Attorney General's letter of May 17  was the observation that the 
serving of food at a traditional political rally promoting a candidate for 
election to public office, to which the general public is invited, lacks the 
essential element of bribery, to-wit: that a voter is given food in exchange 
for his vote, which element was also not present in the distribution of butter 
and cheese. 
Oaths Qf Office 
M unicipal officeholders under the mayor-aldermanic charter, the uniform 
city manager-corTlmission charter, metropolitan government charter or 
private act charters which do not specify the content of the oath for 
municipal officials must take oaths to support the constitutions of 
Tennessee and the Un ited States (required by Article 1 0 , Section 1 ,  
Tennessee Constitution) and for the faithful performance of the duties of the 
office. These oaths are : 
.,, ' do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of 
this State and of the United States. • 
., do solemnly swear that I will perform with fidelity the duties of the office 
to which I have been elected (or appointed, as the case may be) and 
which I am about to assume. · 
(8- 18- 1 1 1) 
These oaths may be administered by any officer legally authorized to 
administer an oath , wh ich general ly includes notaries , judges, and clerks . 
The oath must be written and subscribed to by the person taking it. A 
certificate must accompany the oath , executed by the officer taking the 
oath . It must specify the day and the year the oath was taken (8- 1 8-1 07) . 
The oath must be fi led in the archives of the city under the 
mayor-aldermanic charter (6- 1 -404) ; with the recorder under the uniform 
city manager-commission charter (6-21 - 1 03) ; or in the office designated by 
the metropolitan government charter or private act charter. 
Municipal officials under the modified city manager-council charter must 
take the fol lowing oath : 
., solemnly swear (or affirm) that I possess all the qualifications prescribed 
for the office (or position) of , as prescribed by this charter, 
and that I will, in all respects, observe the provisions of the charter and 
ordinances of the city of , and that I will faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office (or position) of • 
� 
A copy of th is oath must be fi led in  the office of the city clerk (6-31 - 1 1 2) .  
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Disclosure Requirements 
Campaign Financial Disclosure Act of 1 980. Certain requirements 
relative to campaign contributions and expenditures apply to elected 
municipal officials.  Contributions can be loans, loan security, promises, or 
other obligations, whether or not legal ly enforceable, but do not include 
volunteer services, nonpartisan activities designed to encourage persons to 
vote, the use of real or personal property, and the cost of invitations, food , 
and beverages not exceeding $ 1 00, voluntarily provided at an individual's 
residence .  Each cand idate for local public office must file with the county 
election commission a statement that neither receipts nor expenditures 
exceeded $ 1 000, or an itemized statement showing total contributions 
received and expenditures , with amounts over $ 1 00 itemized . These 
disclosures must be filed not later than seven days before a primary election 
and a general election . A statement covering dates from that report, and 
the next 45 days, is due 48 days after the election (2- 1 0- 1 0 1  et �) . 
Conflict of Interests Disclosures . Candidates or appointees to municipal 
offices which are fi l led by a vote of the public are required to fi le confl ict of 
interests disclosure statements with the county election commission within 
ten days after the qual ify ing deadl ine for the election. Persons appointed 
to such a municipal office must also fi le the disclosure statement with in 20 
days after the appointment (8-50-501 .e1 �) . These forms are avai lable 
in the county election commission office and are prescribed by the 
Secretary of State . These forms are also required to be fi led by the above­
mentioned municipal officials each year by January 1 5th. If no information 
on the previous year's statement has changed , the county election 
commission may be notified that none of the information has changed. 
Fai lure to fi le these disclosure forms is punishable by a fine of up to $ 1 000. 
These forms, once fi led , are public records. 
Ouster of Municipal Officials 
Tennessee Code Annotated Section 8-47- 1 0 1 provides that municipal 
officials may be ousted from office for: 
1 .  Knowingly or wi l lfu lly engaging in misconduct while in  office ; 
2 .  Knowingly or wi l l ingly neglecting to perform duties required by law; 
3. Being intoxicated in a publ ic place ; 
4. Engaging in gambl ing ; or 
5. Commit ing any ae! ' violating any penal statute involving moral 
turpitude. 
Deciding what is a crime involving moral turpitude must be made on a case 
by case determination . Generally, a crime involving moral turpitude involves 
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a crime that reflects upon the moral fitness of a person, such as a crime 
involving dishonesty, murder, sale of drugs, and possibly, any crime 
involving intentional and serious bodily harm to others. Many of the cases 
involving determinations of whether crimes are ones of moral turpitude are 
those involving fitness for the granting of a license, such as a beer permit. 
For instance, the case of Gibson v. Ferguson" involved the question of a 
person's fitness for a beer permit. The case held that the offense of Itrolling 
high dice for a Coke", and the offense of failing to immediately release 
seventeen bluegill fish, were not crimes of mora.l turpitude. 
In addition to these grounds for removal, the criminal statutory provisions 
provide grounds, other than those in an ouster suit, for removal of public 
officials. Any official who is convicted of a misdemeanor relative to the 
operation of his or her office will be punished, in addition to the criminal 
punishment for the offense, by removal from office. Examples of 
misdemeanors in office are neglect of duty (39-9-402) ,  drunkenness, 
preventing proper discharge of the duties of office (39-5-403) , and receiving 
a greater commission than legally allowed (39-5-406) . Persons removed 
from office under these provisions are forever disqualified from holding 
office in the state (39-5-401) .5 Generally, an official cannot be removed for 
a misdemeanor offense not a crime of moral turpitude and not a 
misdemeanor in office. 
Ouster proceedings are civil proceedings and may be instituted by the 
attorney general, district attorney general, county or city attorney, who may 
institute such ouster proceedings on their own initiative. It is the duty of 
these attorneys to investigate all written complaints of misconduct by an 
official in their jurisdiction. If after investigation, the attorney decides 
reasonable grounds for the complaint exist, that attorney should institute 
court proceedings (8-47-103) . 
Citizens may also file ouster proceedings (8-47-110) . Ten citizens and 
freeholders are required to institute such proceedings, posting security for 
the costs of the lawsuit, and, upon request by the citizens, the attorneys 
named above must provide assistance to these citizens (8-47-107) . Upon 
a finding of good cause, an official may be suspended from office by the 
judge pending the final hearing of the case (8-47-117) . If a municipal official 
is suspended, a vacancy is created, which is filled as any other vacancy. 
Either party to an ouster proceeding may appeal to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court. Such an appeal will not operate to suspend or vacate the trial 
court's judgment or decree, which remains in force until vacated, revised, 
or modified by the Supreme Court (8-47-123) . 
A municipal official who successfully defends an ouster suit will be restored 
to office, will be allowed court costs, and will be paid the salary of the office 
during the time of any suspension (8-47-121) .6 Persons filling an office 
during a suspension receive the same compensation as that of the regular 
officeholder. 
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A conflict of interests violation (1 2-4-101 ) can also result in a municipal 





Attorney General's Opinion 84-203 dated June 21 , 1 984 regarding having the 
birthday required to qual ify for an office twelve days after the election. 
Attorney General's Opinion 86-03 dated January 1 4, 1 986  relative 
definitions of the terms "residents" and "citizens". 
State ex reI . Anderson v. Fulton, 71 2 S.W.2nd 90 (Tenn. 1 986) . 
Gibson v. Ferguson, 562 S.W.2d 1 88  (Tenn. 1 976) . 
Attorney General's Opinion 85-263 dated October 1 8, 1 985. 
Marshall v. Sevier County, 639 S.W.2d 440 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 982) . 
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· V. ETHICAL CONSI DERATIONS 
Financial Conflict of Interests 
The general law municipal government charters contain provisions 
regulating financial confl ict of interests which confront municipal officials who 
approve, overlook or superintend any municipal work or contract. (6-2-402, 
6-20-205 (b) , 6-35-41 2) .  Municipal officials under metropolitan government 
or private act charters are subject to any confl ict of interests provisions 
contained in the charter for the municipality. 
In addition to these confl ict of interests statutes, municipal officials are 
subject to the basic confl ict of interests statute , Tennessee Code Annotated 
Section 1 2-4- 1 01 , which states :  
It shall not be lawful for any officer, committeeman, director, or other 
person whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to 
superintend any work or any contract in which any municipal corporation, 
county, state, development district, utility districts, human resource 
agencies, and other political subdivision created by statute shall or may 
be interested, to be directly interested in any such contract. -Directly 
interested- means any contract with the official himself or with any business 
in which the official is the sole proprietor, a partner, or the person having 
the controlling interest. -Controlling interesr shall include the individual 
with the ownership or control of the largest number of outstanding shares 
owned by any single individual or corporation. 
It shall not be lawful for any officer, committeeman, director, or other 
person whose duty it is to vote for, let out, overlook, or in any manner to 
superintend any work or any contract in which any municipal corporation 
county, state, development districts, utility districts, human resource 
agencies, and other political subdivisions created by statute shall or may 
be interested, to be indirectly interested in any such contract unless the 
officer publicly acknowledges his interest. -Indirectly interested- means 
any contract in which the officer is interested but not directly so, but 
includes contracts where the officer is directly interested but is the sole 
supplier of goods or services in a municipality or county. 
First, it is interesting to note that the statute only prohibits confl ict of 
interests when the municipal official has a financial interest and wi l l  be voting 
for, overlooking, letting out, or in some manner superintending the work or 
contract. For example, a municipal official could probably bid on providing 
ambulance service for the municipal ity if  that municipal official would not be 
voting for or  overlooking such contract in any manner. The penalty for 
violation is as fol lows: 
Should any person, acting as such officer, committeeman, director, or 
other person referred to /in 12-4- 10 1, be or become directly or unlawfully 
indirectly interested in any such contract, he shall forfeit all pay and 
compensation therefor. ' Such officer shall be dismissed from such office 
he then occupies, and shall be ineligible for the same or similar position 
for ten (10) years. (12-4- 102) 
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The above statute only prohibits pecuniary interests. If a municipal official 
receives no direct pecuniary interest, but is interested in a contract from 
another standpoint, that interest would not be prohibited, so long as the 
municipal official gained no personal financial benefit from the contract. An 
example would a rnunicipal official hiring a friend to work for the 
municipality. Since the municipal official would gain no financial benefit, no 
prohibited conflict of interests exists. 
The question often arises as to whether it is proper for a municipal official 
to have authority on a matter that wil l have a direct financial benefit to a 
relative, such as purchasing copying equipment from a nephew. The 
question becomes more complex when the person who wil l receive the 
direct financial benefit is the spouse of a municipal official . The Attorney 
General has opined that if the spouses commingle assets, a member of a 
legislative body voting on the budget of the board of education which 
employees the spouse of the legislative board member has an indirect 
conflict of interest and must publicly acknowledge the conflict (and also 
recuse himself from voting on the matter, which was then required by 
statute for an indirect conflict of interests). If the spouses do not commingle 
assets, it was the opinion of the Attorney General that the board member 
should recuse himself as a matter of public policy. 
The disclosure of indirect interests is required by the statute which calls for 
"public acknowledgement" of such interests . What is necessary for public 
acknowledgment is unclear, especially in the context of an official such as 
the city manager who does not have an opportunity to acknowledge such 
conflict when the legislative body votes on the matter. Municipa.l officials 
should therefore be careful in indirect conflict of interest situations to provide 
public notice of these interests prior to taking any action. For example, if a 
municipal official purchases supplies from a corporation in which he or she 
owns a small minority (not plurality) interest, this rnust be disclosed publicly. 
As the municipal official may lack a natural public forum for such disclosure, 
some form of written public notice, via bulletin boards in the courthouse or 
other public place and notice in a newspaper of general circulation in the 
municipality, might be appropriate. 
It is important to note that none of the conflict of interests statutes make any 
distinction based on amount of money involved. Therefore, any direct 
financial interest is prohibited. However, the Attorney General has indicated 
that a significant interest might be required, as opposed to a de minimus 
interest . Since it would be very difficult to determine what court might hold 
to be significant, and since the penalty for violation of the conflict of 
interests statute is so severe, municipal officia ls would be well advised to 
consider any interest as significant . 1 
In addition to the basic conflict of interests provision, municipal officials are 
also subject to the conflict of interests prohibition found at Tennessee Code 
Annotated Section 6-54-107, which states as fol lows: 
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No person holding office under any municipal corporation shall, during the 
time for which he was elected or appointed, be capable of contracting with 
such corporation for the performance of any work which is to be paid for 
out of the treasury. Nor shall such person be capable of holding or having 
any other direct interest in such a contract. -Direct interesr means any 
contract with any business in which the official Is the sole proprietor, a 
partner, or the person having the controlling Interest. -Controlling interesr 
shall include the individual with the ownership of control of the largest 
number of outstanding shares owned by any single individual or 
corporation. 
No officer in a municipality shall be indirectly interested in any contract to 
which the municipality shall be indirectly interested in any contract to 
which the officer is interested but not directly so, but includes contracts 
where the officer is directly interested but is the sole supplier of goods or 
services in a municipality. 
Conflict of Interests Based on Incompatible Offices 
Municipal employees, otherwise qualified, are authorized to serve on the 
municipal le�islative body unless expressly prohibited by the charter of the 
municipality. However these municipal officials, while serving on the 
municipal legislative body, must cOrTlply with the aforementioned conflict of 
interests provisions by abstaining from voting on the budget of the 
department or agency in which he or she is employed, or in any manner in 
which he or she is directly interested.3 The Attorney General has also 
opined that such a municipal legislative body member must abstain from 
voting when the member has an indirect conflict of interest, even though 
amendments to the municipal conflict of interests statute would seem to 
permit such voting by such a member of the legislative body. 4 
Although not expressly prohibited by the municipal charter, a municipal 
official cannot hold two incompatible municipal offices. � The determination 
of incompatibil ity is based on whether the occupancy of both offices by the 
same person is detrimental to the public interest, or whether the 
performance of the duties of one interferes with the performance of those 
of the other. In State ex reI. v. Thompson,6 the court held that a member 
of the board of commissioners could not also serve as city manager 
because the board of commissioners determined whether the city manager 
could be discharged, or whether to accept, reject, or modify the 
recommendations of the city manager and di rected and supervised the city 
manager in the administration of the city. 7 
Perks and Bribes 
The Tennessee Constitution and general law prohibits offering bribes for 
votes. Generally, it is also a crirTl inal offense for any elected official to 
accept any bribe (39-5-104). The Constitution and statutes prohibit offering 
bribes for votes.8 Bribery, as commonly understood, is the act of giving or 
receiving a gift for the purpose of affecting the improper discharge of a 
public duty. A "kickback" is a bribe involving the payment of money or 
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property to an individual for causing the county to buy from, to use the 
services of, or to deal otherwise with, the person making the payment. A 
kickback is often viewed as a specific inducement for a particular sale, or 
as a reward for accomplishing a particular purpose. 
Bribery is a felony and any municipal official convicted for bribery will be 
punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 21 years. 
Persons convicted of attempting to bribe a public official will also be subject 
to punishment. The law that appl ies to municipal officials states:  
Any executive, legislative, or judicial officer who corruptly accepts, or 
agrees to accept, any gift or gratuity, or thing of value, or any promise to 
make any gift, or do any act beneficial to such officer, under an agreement 
or with an understanding that his vote, opinion, or judgment is to be given 
in any particular manner, or upon any particular side of any question or 
proceeding which is, or may by law be brought, before him in his official 
capacity, or that, in such capacity, he is to make any particular 
appointment, shall, on conviction, be punished by imprisonment in the 
penitentiary for not less than three (3) nor more than twenty-one (2 1) years. 
(39-5- 103) 
The classic kickback situation , on a municipal level , involves a municipal 
official who is approached by a sales agent and is offered 1 0% of the 
purchase price if the municipality purchases his equipment. The official is 
influential in the subsequent purchase of the equipment and receives his 
"cut" . Both parties are gui lty of bribery. It does not matter which party 
initiated the il legal transaction.  Further, i f  the municipal official solicited the 
kickback, the municipal official would be gui lty of bribery regard less of 
whether the sales agent agreed to pay the bribe. Whi le bribery in terms of 
money is the most frequent and the most prosecuted form, other business 
practices that involve the g iving of other amenities must be careful ly 
scrutinized . 
Perks, which are usually small benefits that have no promise to act in  any 
manner connected with them , are not a violation of the general law. 
However, as the difference between a perk and a bribe can be a subtle 
difference in intent, the municipal official should be carefu l in accepting gifts 
or other benefits . It is possible that gratuities or perks , such as free food, 
lodging , and transportation g iven to a municipal official by private parties 
with whom the official conducts municipal business may be considered a 
bribe. The g reater the value of the perk or gratu ity , the more difficult it 
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VI. SOURCE AND EXERCISE OF MUNICIPAL POWERS 
Sources of Municipal Powers 
General Assembly. Subject to any constitutional provision, the power of 
a municipality can be l imited at will by the legislature. The classic statement 
of the municipality's relationship to the state was stated by Judge John F. 
Di l lon speaking for the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Clinton v. Cedar 
Rapids and M issouri Railroad Company, 24 Iowa 455 ( 1 868) : 
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers from, 
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they 
cannot exist. As it created, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may 
abridge the control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the 
right, the legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable 
of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the 
municipal corporations of the state, and the corporations could not prevent 
it. We know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations 
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at 
will of the legislature. 
Tennessee fol lows the general rule set down by Di l lon . Luehrman v. Taxing 
District of Shelby County, 70 Tenn.  425 ( 1 879) ; Smiddy v. City of Memphis, 
1 40 Tenn .  97 ( 1 91 8) ;  Barnes v. City of Dayton, 21 6 Tenn.  400 ( 1 964) . In 
Smiddy v. City of Memphis, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that 
simply because the leg islature conferred upon a municipality a particular 
right at some time did not mean that r ight was vested in the municipality; 
the legislature cou ld take it away at wi l l .  What the leg islature giveth, the 
legislature can taketh away. 
2 McQu i l l in ,  Mun iCipal Corporations Section 4.04,  p. 1 5- 1 6 (3d Ed. 1 988) 
provides as fol lows : 
In accordance with the settled doctrine that muniCipal corporations of all 
kinds, including incorporated cities, towns, vii/ages and boroughs, are 
creatures, agencies, instrumentalities, departments, auxiliaries, or politically 
subordinate subdivisions of the state government, the legislature, unless 
restrained by the constitution, in conferring powers and imposing 
obligations on municipal corporations, may within its discretion designate 
limitations thereon. 
Dil lon's Rule 
Judge Dil lon didn't stop with saying that municipal corporations are "mere 
tenants at wil l of the leg islature," he also set out what is known as Dil lon's 
B..ule: 
� 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal 
corporation possess and can exercise the following powers, and no 
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily 
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or fairly implied In or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those 
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of 
the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, 
reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is 
resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied. 
Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations. 448-449 (5th Ed. 19 1 1). 
Under the criminal and other branches of the law one can do what is not 
prohibited. However, under municipal law, a municipality can do only what 
it is permitted to do. The municipal ity seeking to take some action must find 
a grant of power someplace in the state constitution or from the state 
legislature which permits it to act. Where does it find those powers? 
(1) Those granted in express words. 
(2) Those powers impl ied in the express grant. 
(3) Those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects 
and purposes of the corporation . 
Di l lon's Rule also provides that the courts wi l l  resolve any "fa. ir ,  reasonable, 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power" against the 
municipal ity. 
Delegated Powers 
Dil lon's Rule is no cause to board up city hal l  and go home. Municipal ities 
have been around for a long time since Di l lon uttered his famous rule. 
Numerous powers, express, impl ied , and essentia l ,  have been delegated to 
cities and towns. Among those powers are the fol lowing : 
Part of the Pol ice Power of the State 
Condemnation of Property 
Creation of Municipal Officers 
Enactment of Ordinances 
Establishment of Hospitals and Other Publ ic Health Institutions 
Municipal Ownership of Publ ic Uti l ities 
Special Assessments and Bond Issues 
Creation ,  Regulation and Control of Streets and Other Public Ways 
and Places 
Taxation 





The Police Powers 
Among the above-mentioned powers, the police power is particularly 
important because it is extremely broad and is the basis for most municipal 
regulation of business and industry. 
What is the police power? No mention of it is found in the Tennessee 
Constitution and it is apparently mentioned in no other state constitution. 
It is inherent in the state. 
The police power has been defined as follows : 
The police power is not susceptible of exact definition, there should, 
indeed, be no specific definition of it, and in truth, the extent of the power 
has never been defined with precision. The power knows no definite 
limitations, since in its widest sense it is the power "to govern men and 
things . .  : The police power is dynamic in character . .  .it must be 
considerably elastic within limits in order to offset the changing and 
shifting conditions which, from time to time arise through the increase 
and shift of population and the flex and complexity of commercial and 
social relations . . .  {The Police Power] is the broadest of government powers 
since it is the government Dower over all matters affecting the peace. 
order. health. morals. convenience. comfort. and safety of citizens and 
other subjects. It is the power to establish social order, to protect the life 
and health of persons, to secure their existence and comfort and to 
safeguard them in their employment of private and social life and the 
beneficial use of property. (Emphasis added) 6A McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations Section 24. 03, p. 14- 15, Section 24. 04 pp. 17- 18 (3d Ed. 
1988). 
The Supreme Court in Porter v. City of Paris, 1 54 Tenn . 556 (1 947), when 
presented with a challenge to the installation of parking meters on the 
grounds that their instal lation was a municipal tax not authorized by the city 
charter and against public policy, held as follows : 
The police power of a state or a municipality as an arm of the state, 
extends to the making of such laws and ordinances as are necessary to 
secure the safety, health, good order, peace, comfort, protection and 
convenience of the state or municipality. 
But as broad as the police power is, it has lirrlits . In H & L Messengers. Inc. 
v. City of Brentwood, 577 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1 979), the Supreme Court of 
Tennessee held that an ordinance violated both the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and Article 1 ,  Section 1 9  of the Tennessee 
Constitution because it unduly restricted the distribution of handbills within 
the city. The city had a uniform city manager commission charter, which 
authorized the city : 
To define, prohibit, abate, suppress, prevent, and regulate all acts, 
practices, conduct, businesses, occupations, callings, trades, use of 
property, and all other things whatsoever detrimental. or liable to be 
detrimental. to the health. morals. comfort. safety. convenience. or welfare 
of the inhabitants of the city and to exercise general Dolice Dowers. 
(Emphasis added) 
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The court said that liThe right to exercise the police power is an attribute of 
sovereignity, necessary to protect the public safety, health, morals and 
welfare, and is of vast and undefined extent. In exercising this right. 
municipalities have wide discretion and broad powers. " (Emphasis added) . 
Regulating litter on city streets and in public places is a permissible and 
public purpose and an ordinance to accomplish that objective furthers an 
important governmental interest, said the Court, but, "its purpose must be 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Constitutional guarantees 
are superior to the police power. 
Exercise of Municipal Powers by Ordinance. Usually anything a city or 
town says which is intended to have a continuing or permanent affect or 
contains a penalty is spoken by ordinance. According to McQuillin, '1he 
passage of an ordinance is, of course, a legislative act, a legislative function 
and equivalent to legislative action. II McQuillin goes on to say that an 
ordinance is of greater dignity than a resolution or motion and "must be 
invested, not necessarily literally, but substantially, with the formalities, 
solemnities and characteristics of an ordinance as distinguished from a 
simple motion or resolution ."  5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 
15.01, p. 34-35, Section 15.02, p. 37-39 (3rd Ed. 1 981 ). 
Ordinances basically fit into four types: 
(1 ) Penal Ordinances. These are ordinances which prescribe certain 
rules of conduct and penalty for their violation. The violator may be 
brought before the municipal court and, if found guilty of the charge 
against rlim/her, may be fined according to the law. The maximum 
fine which may be imposed by a municipal court is $50.00. That is 
true even if your charter says otherwise. 
(2) Adrninistrative Ordinances. These are ordinances which guide and 
regulate municipal offices in the conduct and administration of 
municipal business. These ordinances may be of long term or 
permanent effect such as an ordinance establishing and prescribing 
rules for the operation of the municipa.l court, or they may be 
temporary, such as an ordinance authorizing the mayor to execute 
a contract for the sale of certain city property. 
(3) Franchise Ordinances. These are ordinances which grant special 
privileges within the municipality, such as a cable television franchise . 
(4) Improvement Ordinances. These are ordinances which authorize 
and specify the terms of financing for public improvements of various 
kinds. 
5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations Section 15.09, p. 60 (3rd Ed. 
1981) . 
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An ordinance. and not resolution or a motion. is used to establish rules and 
regulations. the violation of which carries a fine or a penalty. An ordinance 
must also be used where the charter or general law requires it. Ordinances 
are always in writing. According to McQui l l in , "an ordinance must be 
reduced to writing before action to pass it can occur; the legislative will can 
be expressed in no other manner. II 5 McQui l l in ,  Municipa,1 Corporations 
Section 1 6. 1 1 ,  p .  1 37 (3d Ed. 1 981 ) .  
There is no general law in  Tennessee establ ishing procedures for enacting 
ordinances ; each city or town must look to its own charter for the 
procedure .  I f  the charter is si lent on that subject, McQuil l in says that no 
particular formality needs to be adopted to enact an ordinance. McQuil l in 
continues that where no form is prescribed " . . .  any form which clearly 
signifies the corporate wi l l that the ordinance or by- law be enacted, exists 
or wi l l  become effective on a certain date and that plain ly indicates what the 
terms and objects of the ordinance suffices. II 5 McQui l l in ,  Mun icipal 
Corporations Section 1 6. 1 1 ,  p. 1 37 (3rd Ed. 1 981 ) .  
However, most charters prescribe the procedure for enacting ordinances 
and a few even prescribe the form to some extent. If a procedure for an 
ordinance is prescribed , substantial compliance with the procedure is 
required. An ordinance not signed by the mayor as prescribed by the 
charter was declared invalid by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 
Memphis Street Ry. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co. ,  1 38 Tenn .  594 ( 1 91 7) .  A 
zoning ordinance was held invalid by the same court in  Lightman v. City of 
Nashvil le ,  1 66 Tenn .  1 91 ( 1 932) , because the city fai led to hold a publ ic 
hearing and obtain a report from the Zoning Commission prior to passing 
the ordinance as was required by charter. In City of Lebanon v. Baird , 756 
S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1 988) , the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused to 
enforce a contract which had not been adopted in compliance with the 
charter of the City of Lebanon. 
The city or town must also find authority to support the ord inance. To find 
that authority one must refer to the charter and to the general laws. 
Remember that the authority does not have to be express ; it may be implied 
authority or authority essential to the objects and purposes of the municipal 
corporation.  
Ordinances cannot confl ict with the Constitution of the United States, the 
Tennessee Constitution or general law or be repugnant to the general pol icy 
of the state. In  H & L Messengers. I nc. v. City of Brentwood , 577 S.W. 2d 
444 (Tenn.  1 979) , the Supreme Court of Tennessee invalidated an 
ordinance prohibiting the d istribution of handbi l ls in  certain places on the 
premise that it violated both the free speech provisions of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I ,  Section 
1 9 , of the Tennessee Constitution .  
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee resolved a confl ict between state 
statutes designed to help remove obstacles to handicapped people l iving in  
family-l ike settings and a local zoning ord inance in  favor of the state 
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statutes. In N ichols v. Tul lahoma Open Door. Inc. , 640 S.W.2d 1 3  
(Tenn.Ct.App. 1 982) the court was required to interpret Tennessee Code 
Annotated Section 1 3-24-1 02, which provided that for the purposes of any 
zoning law in Tennessee, the classification "single-family residence" wou ld 
include any home in  which eight or less unrelated mental ly retarded or 
mentally or physical ly handicapped people and up to two houseparents or 
guardians resided , and Tennessee Code Annotated Section 1 3-24- 1 03, 
which provided that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 1 3-24-1 02 took 
precedence over any local zoning ordinance or law to the contrary. The 
city's zoning ord inance permitted single family dwel l ings in R-1 residential 
districts, and defined a fami ly as "one or more persons occupying a single 
dwel l ing un it, provided that unless al l members are related of blood or 
marriage, no such fami ly shal l  contain over five (5) persons . . .  " 
The plaintiffs argued that the leg islature in  passing the statutes in question ,  
usurped local zoning powers. To that argument the Court responded : 
We reject this contention, however, for the reason that municipalities in 
Tennessee have no authority other than that granted by the legislature and 
the legislature may remove or alter that authority as it chooses. It is 
elementary that statutes prescribing how delegated police power may be 
exercised by municipalities are mandatory and exclusive. Municipal 
authorities cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of state laws 
or are repugnant to the general policy of the state. 
An interesting aspect of this case from a po lice powers standpoint is an 
argument used by the plaintiffs that the statutes in question violated the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the U nited States 
and Article 1 ,  Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution which prohibit ,  in  
almost identical terms, the taking of l ife,  l iberty and property without due 
process of law. The plaintiffs were residents in the R- 1 district i n  which the 
home for handicapped people was located , and no doubt their property 
values were reduced as a resu lt. They argued that the reduction in  the 
value of their property stemmed from the statutes and represented an 
arbitrary and capricious taking of their property . 
The Court rejected that argument as fol lows : 
The public powers of the legislature include the power to restrict the use 
of private property and to cause diminution of its value so long as the 
legislative measures are reasonably related to protecting the public health, 
safety, comfort, welfare and morals. 
The legislature may impose any limitation upon the use of property which 
it may deem necessary or expedient to promote and protect the safety, 
health, morals, comfort and welfare of the people, provided only that the 
power shall not be exercised arbitrarily; that is, without reasonable 
connection or relation between the limitation imposed and the public 
safety, health or welfare.-. . . 
The court concluded that the integration of physical ly and mental ly 
handicapped people into society was a reasonable exercise of the 
legislature's pol ice power. 
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This case i l lustrates once again that the police power belongs to the state 
and is extremely broad . It may be delegated to a city or town but it resides 
in the state. The state may exercise it as wel l  as delegate it, and the state's 
exercise may l imit municipal authority. Its exercise may also diminish 
property values and otherwise interfere with and restrict the use of property. 
This is true even when a municipality exercises its delegated pol ice powers . 
In M i l ler v. City of Memphis, 1 8 1 Tenn. 1 5  ( 1 943) the court upheld a 
chal lenge to a city's regulation of juke boxes which the city based on a 
charter provision g iving the board of commissioners the "authority to 
prohibit and regulate by ordinance the making of unnecessary noises . . .  of 
any automobile . . .  bus . . .  or by any radio , phonograph,  musical instrument, or 
other sound devices . . .  " The fact that the charter provision did not mention 
juke boxes did not bother the Court, which held that: 
A municipality has no inherent authority to enact ordinances whose validity 
and enforcement rests upon general police powers. All powers of a 
municipality are derived from the State, but it cannot be doubted that the 
State may delegate its authority, or some portion of it. the police power 
primarily inheres in the state, but if the state constitution does not forbid, 
the legislature may delegate a part of such power to the municipal 
corporations of the state, either in express terms or by implication . . .  
A case which i l lustrates authority essential to the objects and purposes of 
the municipal corporation is Penn-Dixie Cement Corporation v. Kingsport, 
1 89 Tenn .  450 ( 1 949) . That case involved the right of a municipality to 
enact an ordinance for the abatement of smoke and dust from 
manufacturing plants . A state statute gave cities and towns authority as 
fol lows : 
To define, prohibit, abate, suppress, prevent, and regulate all acts, 
practices, conduct, business, occupations, callings, trades, uses of 
property and all other things whatsoever detrimental, or liable to be 
detrimental, to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience or welfare 
of the inhabitants of the city, and to exercise general police powers. 
Limit occupations liable to become a nuisance. To prescribe limits within 
which business occupations and practices are liable to be nuisances or 
detrimental to the health, morals, security or general welfare of the people 
may be lawfully established, conducted or maintained. 
The Court declared that these general law provisions were part of the city's 
charter (which contained simi lar provisions) . 
The plaintiff argued that because neither the city's charter nor the general 
law expressly gave the city the authority to abate smoke and dust, the city's 
ordinance was void . The Court agreed , hold ing that (a) "mun icipal ity has 
no inherent authority to enact ordinances whose val id ity rests upon general 
pol ice powers, II but that power can be implied , "where it is essential to the 
objects and purposes of a municipal corporation . I I  The court also held that 
one of the ch ief purposes of a municipal corporation is the, "protection of 
the public  health and safety of its inhabitants". 
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There must be a reasonable connection between the limitations imposed by 
the ordinance and its purpose. In H & L Messengers. Inc. v City of 
Brentwood, 577 S.W. 2d 444 (Tenn. 1 979), the court was concerned that the 
purpose of the ordinance in question was to prevent littering, but while it 
prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills, it exempted the 
distribution of political and religious material . The Court observed that : 
With respect to each of these sections containing exemptions in favor of 
ideological speech, we point out that it is indisputably true that religious 
tracts or political leaflets cast upon a citizen's property constitutes litter to 
precisely the same extent as circulars advertising groceries. The 
exemption not only destroys the indispensable content neutrality of the 
ordinance, but leaves it standing upon a precarious position from a 
standpoint of its purposes. (Emphasis added) 
All ordinances must be examined in that light. Look with extreme care at 
exemptions from the application of the ordinance which leave in existence 
the same problem you seek to eliminate. 
Ordinances must be definite and certain. Fortunately, definite and certain 
sometimes means something different than good draftsmanship . Poor 
ordinance draftsmanship is common in Tennessee and elsewhere, but the 
issue is not necessarily whether the ordinance is poorly drafted but whether 
it is definite and certain enough to give those affected by it notice of what 
limitations it imposes and that it is in operation. However, it is almost 
unnecessary to say that poor ordinance draftsmanship and the lack of 
ordinance clarity frequently go hand in hand. 
Definitiveness and certainty is particularly important in the drafting of penal 
ordinances and ordinances which impose a tax or a licensing requirement. 
Ambiguous penal ordinances or ordinances which impose a tax or a 
licenSing requirement are construed against the city. In City of Kingsport v. 
Jones, 1 96 Tenn. 544 (1 953), the Supreme Court of Tennessee interpreted 
an ordinance which made it, lIunlawful for any person, firm or corporation to 
transport, sell, store, distribute, receive or possess for sale within the City 
and/or manufacture beer .. . within the City ... " The Court held that the 
ordinance did not make it unlawful to store beer within the city for sale 
outside the city ! The Court concluded as follows : "A penal statute or 
ordinance will not be enlarged by implication or intendment beyond the fair 
meaning of the language used, and will not be held to include these 
offenses other than those which are already described." 
An ordinance in City of Greenfield v. Collins, 1 95 Tenn. 285 (1 953), imposed 
a vehicle l icense fee in the following language: 
Every person, a resident--of the city, who owns or operates a motor vehicle 
In the city, and, every person a non-resident who comes regularly within 
the city in pursuit of some business or occupation and who operates 
regularly within the city in pursuit of some business or occupation and who 
operates regularly an automobile or other motor vehicle within the 
city . . .  shall, within five days after receiving a state license and number for 
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operating the motor vehicle, under the laws of the State of Tennessee, or 
within five days after he shall begin such operation, annually register tJ§. 
motor vehicle with the city clerk, giving the name of the car, . . .  and for such 
registration, stJall pay an annual fee of $3.00. (Emphasis added) 
A woman who was charged with violating the ordinance l ived in the county 
outside the corporate l imits but had a job in the city and drove there 
everyday in an automobi le owned and l icensed in the name of her husband. 
It was in h is car that she was cited for fai l ing to have a vehicle l icense. 
The court held that the woman had not violated the ordinance because the 
phrase "his motor vehicle" in the ordinance restricted its application to the 
owners of motor vehicles . Then the Court went on to say that: 
Clearly, if it  had been the legislative intent to extend the operation of 
automobiles . . .  city council would have used appropriate language to effect 
that result and would have employed the phrase -rhe motor vehicle. · 
(Emphasis added) 
Resolutions 
Resolutions are not ordinances. Unless there is some express requirement 
otherwise, they are usually less solemn and formal than ordinances. As 
might be expected then , they usual ly need to be in no particu lar form , 
although virtually al l of them are written.  Resolutions usually are not subject 
to the same procedural requi rements as ord inances; they do not have to be 
passed on a certain number of read ings, be signed by the mayor, be 
passed over a mayor's veto , or be published in order to become effective 
un less, of course , the charter or a general law requires otherwise. 
Resolutions are not legislative acts ; they speak the "opinion or mind" of the 
municipal governing body on a subject or issue before it. They are not 
used to establish rules and regu lations, the violation of which carries a fine 
or penalty . 
However, be carefu l on this pOint! Resolutions may create rig hts in people 
against the municipal ity and against municipal officials as individuals. For 
example, many municipalities have personnel pol icies and procedures 
established by resolution ; perfectly acceptable un less the charter or general 
law provides otherwise . Those resolutions do not make municipal officials 
subject to a fine if they fai l  to obey those personnel policies and 
procedures. But, those pol icies and procedures may create rights in 
municipal employees, and the fai lure of the municipality and municipal 
officials to observe these rights may subject both the municipality and the 
municipal officials as individuals to l iabi l ity under various laws. Do not 
presume that a resolution , because it is a resolution and not an ordinance, 
does not create rights and liabi l ities. 
General ly ,  resolutions can be used for al l municipal actions unless the 
charter or general laws prescribes the contemplated action be done by 
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ordinance. If an ordinance is prescribed by the charter or general law, a 
resolution is not legal ly sufficient. If in doubt, act by ordinance . 
Motions 
A motion is usually less forma.l than either an ordinance or resolution .  
Genera"y, it relates to the doing of one th ing, and when that one thing i s  
done, the motion has no further effect. For example, a motion to  pay 
Podunk Motors $2,387.00 for a used dump truck purchased by the Town 
of Turtle Creek, has no further effect than authorizing the payment of that 
amount of money to that business. Most motions are not written and 
require no particular form or procedure to make them effective except their 
approval by the municipal governing body. 
36 
VII. LIABILITY PROBLEMS 
Municipal Liability 
Tennessee Govern mental Tort Liability Act.1 Prior to 1 973, Tennessee 
municipalities were subject to the state's sovereign immunity for 
governmental acts , but could be held l iable for proprietary acts . 
Govern mental acts were those activities that were peculiar to governments , 
or activities only governments could provide, such as pol ice protection ,  fire 
protection, education , or tax collection. Proprietary activities were those that 
could be provided by private as wel l as governmental entities, such as water 
and sewer service, electrical services, and mass transit. In 1 973, the 
Tennessee General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Govern mental Tort 
Liabi l ity Act (29-20- 1 01 et seq.) which provides that a municipality is immune 
from al l  suits arising out of its activities, either governmental or proprietary, 
unless immunity is specifical ly removed by the Tennessee Governmental 
Tort Liabi l ity Act. Federal law may preempt such immunity and state 
statutes cannot exempt local governments and officials from l iabi l ity under 
federal causes of action . 
Areas in which the act removes governmental immunity are: 
1 .  claims arising from the negl igent operation of motor vehicles ; 
2. claims arising from negl igently constructing or maintaining streets , 
al leys, or sidewalks ; 
3. claims arising from the negligent construction or maintenance of 
publ ic improvements ; and 
4. claims aris ing from the neg ligence of municipal employees.  
There are sti l l  further exceptions to these areas where immunity is removed . 
These are activities for which the government retains immunity and include : 
1 .  claims ariSing from the exercise of discretion by a municipal 
employee , even if this discretion is abused ; 
2. claims arising out of false imprisonment ,  mal icious prosecution , 
intentional trespass ,  abuse of process , l ibel , slander, deceit, 
interference with contractual rights , infl iction of emotional distress, 
invasion of privacy, and violation of civil rights ; 
3 .  claims arising out of the issuance of permits or l icenses or the fai lure 
to issue such permits or l icenses ; 
4. claims arising from the fai lure to inspect, or negl igent inspection ; 
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5. claims arising from the institution of judicial or administrative 
proceedings; 
6. claims arising from negligent or intentional misrepresentation ; 
7. claims arising from mob actions or riots; and 
8. claims arising from the assessment or collection of taxes .  
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act provides certain l iabi l ity l imits 
which l imit the municipalities' potential l iabil ity , which are the greater of (a) 
the municipality's insurance l imits or (b) the fol lowing amounts : 
1 .  Personal Injury in a Non-Automobi le Case : $ 1 30 ,000 
2. Property Damage in a Non-Automobile Case : $ 20 ,000 
3. Personal Injury in an Automobile Case : 
4. Property Damage in an Automobile Case : 
$350,000 
$ 50 ,000 
The Tennessee Governmental Tort Liab i l ity Act provides that in cases where 
the municipality is l iable,  the municipal employees are immune.  In situations 
where the municipal ity is immune under the Tennessee Governmental Tort 
Liabi l ity Act, the municipal employee wi l l  have the l iabi l ity l imits set forth 
above , except for medical malpractice clauses. 
Non-Tort Liabil ity Under State Law. The Tennessee Governmental Tort 
Liabi l ity Act does not apply to worker's compensation actions, inverse 
condemnation,  breach of contract actions, and other non-tort actions. 
M unicipal ities and mun icipal officers sti l l  remain l iable, and the l iabil ity l imits 
of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liabi l ity Act have no appl icabil ity to 
these actions. 
Worker's Compensation. Worker's compensation is a statutory scheme 
for compensating employees who suffer injuries in the scope of their 
employment. 2 This scheme uses a schedule of determined amounts for 
particu lar types of injuries. Municipalities may exempt themselves from 
providing worker's compensation benefits pursuant to this statutory scheme 
(50-6-1 06) , but the l iabi l ity statu,s of a municipality so opting when faced with 
a claim by an injured employee suffered in the scope of employment has 
not been clearly established by the courts.3 
Inverse Condem nation . I nverse condemnation or reverse condemnation 
actions are authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29- 1 6-1 23 to 
provide a remedy for property owners whose property is taken by a 
municipality for a publ ic purposes without the property owner receiving just 
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compensation. The extent of l iabil ity in such an action would be the fair 
market value taken by the municipality plus any incidental damages incurred 
by the property owner. 
Breach of Contract. Municipal ities are responsible for the breach of a 
contract entered into by the municipal ity as would any private individual .  
The extent of l iabi l ity in such a contract action would depend on the terms 
of the contract and the damages suffered by the parties. Also the 
municipal ity could be required by a court to perform according to the terms 
of the contract. 
There are other non-tort areas of l iabi l ity for municipalities such as publ ic 
records violations , open meetings violations and numerous others .  Your  
city attorney should be  consu lted anytime issues concerning any of these 
matters should arise. 
Federal Rig hts of Actions. Except for the l imited protection provided by 
the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the Un ited States , federal 
law overrides, or preempts , state law. Federal causes of action are based 
on the Constitution of the United States or its amendments , or various 
federal statutes. Actions based on 42 U .S .C.  § 1 983 or federal civi l  rights 
actions, can now be brought in state court. 
Any action , including hir ing, fi ring,  awarding contracts, promotions, or other 
actions simi lar in nature , which are motivated by discriminatory intent or 
which have discriminatory effect, or which deprive a person of due process 
of law must be careful ly avoided by municipal officials as they open the door 
for the municipality and municipal officials to be held l iable based on the 
Constitution of the Un ited States and various federal statutes. 
Personal Liability 
There are several areas, including various federal and state actions, where 
a municipal official could be held personal ly l iable. Some actions have a 
good faith defense and others do not. Under present state law, employees 
are total ly immune when the municipal ity is l iable under the Tennessee 
Governmental Tort Liabi l ity Act, except for medical malpractice claims, 
un less the act or omission was wi l lfu l ,  malicious, criminal ,  or performed for 
personal financial gain. In  situations where the municipality is immune, the 






Pivnick, Tenn. Circuit Court Prac. (2nd Ed . )  Section 32 (1 986) . 
Title 50, Chapter 6, Tennessee Code Annotated. 
Attorney General's Opinion 86-1 1 3  dated June 24, 1 986, provides that the 
municipal ity would be l iable for such a claim under the Tennessee Governmental 
Tort Liabil ity Act. 
. 
Pol ing v. Goins, 71 3 S .W.2d 305 (Tenn.  1 986) . 
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VIII. MISCE LLANEOUS ISSUES 
Open Records 
All records of the offices of the municipality are open to the public for public 
inspection and copying unless specifically made confidential by statute 
( 1 0-7-503) . If a municipal official refuses to allow members of the public 
access to any record which is a public record , the person so denied access 
can fi le a petition in the chancery court to obtain access to these records 
( 1 0-7-505) . 
A recent amendment to the Open Records Act provides that a party who is 
wrongful ly denied access to the publ ic records and who obtains access to 
the records by order of the chancery court can recover his or her attorney's 
fees from the municipal ity. This amendment was adopted to prevent 
municipal officials from refusing access to public records except when 
ordered to grant access by the chancery court.  Such a practice can now 
result in  significant financial liabil ity to the municipality. 
Disposition of Records 
A large number of records are required to be maintained by municipal 
officials , and therefore , storage problems usual ly occur which require 
municipal officials to seek a method to dispose of old and obsolete records.  
Since many of the records maintained by the many rTlunicipal officials are 
historical ly significant, great care must be taken in the storage and/or 
disposition of old or less frequently uti l ized records. 
In  recognition of the problems that municipalities encounter with records 
disposition , the General Assembly has created a statutory framework for the 
storage or disposition of municipal records ( 1 0-7-40 1 et seq) . Each county 
is required to establish a County Public Records Commission to oversee the 
storage or disposal process for a. 1 I  public records, including municipal 
records, as orig inal permanent records which have been reproduced or 
microfi lmed cannot be legal ly destroyed without approval of the Commission 
( 1 0-7-404) . After the County Public Records Commission approves of the 
disposition of municipal records ,  the municipal legislative body must concur 
in the d isposition of the records ( 1 0-7-405) . 
Sunshine Act 
The Sunshine or Open Meetings Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 
8-44-1 01 , et seg. , requires that al l legislative body meetings or meetings of 
any govern ing body be open to the public. When the body holds its regu lar 




"Governing body" is defined by the open meetings law as ''the members of 
any public body which consists of two or more members with authority to 
make decisions or recommendations to a public body on policy or 
administration. I I  "Meeting" is defined as ''the convening of a governing body 
of a public body for which a quorum is required in order to make decisions 
or to deliberate toward decisions on any matter. II 
In Fain v. Faculty of College of Law of Univ. of Tennessee, 552 S.W.2d 752 
(Tenn .Ct.App. 1 977) , the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that a 
committee of faculty members and students created to assist the dean in 
decision-making did not constitute a "govern ing body" pursuant to the 
Sunshine Act because such a committee made recommendations to the 
dean as opposed to any public body. 
The requirements for "adequate public notice" are not specified in the law, 
and the courts have interpreted that requirement to require such notice 
based on the total ity of the circumstances as would fai rly inform the pUblic. 1 
In  Bi lbury v Burgess, Tenn.  App. , Mid . Section , April 1 ,  1 977, the court 
upheld the posting of a sign in the window of the city recorder's office of an 
emergency meeting of the Board of Aldermen later that same afternoon 
when the newspapers in the county attended the meeting and witnesses 
testified that they had observed the sign in the window of the recorder's 
office . 
As a general rule, the more formal the meeting,  the more stringent the 
notice requirements . For example, a committee meeting of three municipal 
legislative body members meeting to formulate a recommendation on a 
minor city decision may obtain "adequate public notice" by simply posting 
notice of their meeting in public places, while a meeting of the city budget 
committee might achieve "adequate public notice" only through newspaper 
publ ication . Common sense is the best rule when attempting to determine 
the form of adequate public notice for a meeting. 
There had been considerable controversy concerning the definition of a 
meeting, and whether a quorum is required , and other questions about 
what type of meeting must be open to the public. A narrow exception has 
been jud icially established regarding discussions concerning pending 
l itigation with the county attorney.2 
Federal Fa ir La bor Sta ndards Act 
On February 1 9 , 1 985, the United States Su preme Court, in Garcia v. San 
Antonio Transit Authority, overruled the National League of Cities v. Usery 
case decided in 1 976, and held that the provisions of the Federal Fai r Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U .S.C.  201 et seq. , hereinafter "FLSA", are appl icable to 
state and local government employees. 3 On November 1 9, 1 985, Congress 
responded to the Garcia case by passing the Fair Labor Standards Act 
Amendments of 1 985, which had the effect of granting local governments 
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a grace period unti l  April 1 5, 1 986, from application of the overtime 
provisions of the FLSA. The amendments also made special provisions for 
compensatory time used by local government employees and made other 
significant changes. The grace period has now expired , and the 
municipal ities of Tennessee and other states must be in ful l compliance with 
the amended provisions of the FLSA, includ ing minimum wage, overtime 
and recordkeeping provisions. The Department of Labor has issued 
regulations that are to be used in interpreting the amendments and the 
FLSA's appl icabil ity to municipalities." 
The FLSA requires that the minirrlum wage be paid to al l employees, 
regulates the employment of minors, requires that employers keep certain 
records,  and requires overtime pay for covered employees. The FLSA does 
not require vacation,  hol iday, severance, or sick pay, does not require meal 
or rest periods, holidays off, or vacation time off, does not l imit the number 
of hours an employee over 16 years of age may work ( it only requires 
overtime compensation for covered employees) , does not require premium 
pay for weekend or holiday work, does not require pay raises or fringe 
benefits, and does not require a discharge notice, reasons for d ischarge,  or 
immediate payment of final wages. 
Municipal officials must consider FLSA impl ications on personnel decisions 
and work in  cooperation with the municipal legislative body to implement 
pol icies and agreements with the employees to meet the requirements of 
the FLSA so as to uti l ize the provisions that require affirmative po licies, such 
as compensatory time, if desirable. 
Exemptions. The sirrlple payment of a salary in l ieu of an hourly wage has 
no bearing on whether an employee is exempt from the provisions of the 
FLSA. However, there are certain persons to whom the provisions of the 
FLSA do not apply. These include true "independent contractors". 
There are also other employees who are exempt from the overtime 
provisions. Among others not noted here, these exemptions include:  
1 .  Elected pub lic officials, who are not subject to civil service laws of the 
state , county or agency. 
2 .  "White col lar" exemptions, including executive , administrative , or 
professional employees. 
3. Volunteers who may receive nominal pay and actual expenses . 
4. Seasonal employees . 
White Col lar  Exem ptions. - The "white col lar" exemptions mentioned above 
provide a "safe harbor" test, or short test, for employees receiving a salary 
of greater than $250 per week. For an executive employee meeting this 
salary requirement to be exempt, the employee's duties must primarily 
consist of the management of the employing enterprise or a recognized 
43 
department thereof, with two or more full time employees under that 
employee's direction . To meet the administrative exemption, the same 
salary threshold appl ies and the employee's duties must primarily consist 
of the performance of office or non-manual work directly relating to the 
management or operation of the employing enterprise, or performance of 
administrative functions, or teaching in an educational establishment, and 
the employee rnust regularly exercise discretion and independent 
judgement. 
The tests for meeting these "white col lar" exemptions for employees who do 
not meet the salary threshold sti l l  requ ire a minimum salary of $ 1 55 per 
week and more stringent tests regarding duties. 
Compensable Hours . The statutory definition of the term "employ" under 
the FLSA is Uto suffer or permit to workll . Compensable hours of work 
include al l  times during which the employee is on duty or on the employer's 
premises under conditions which prevent the employee from using the time 
for personal activities. Work not requested or required by the employer, but 
al lowed or permitted , is work time under the FLSA, even if performed away 
from the premises or the job site, or even at home. If the employer knows 
or has reason to bel ieve that work is being performed , the work must be 
counted as hours worked.  
Breaks . Generally, periods during which an employee is completely 
rel ieved from duty and which are long enough to enable the employee to 
use the time effectively for his or her own purposes are not hours worked . 
Rest periods of short duration, running from 5 minutes to about 20 minutes,  
must be counted as hours worked. Meal periods of at least 30 minutes or 
more,  where an employee is completely rel ieved from duty, are not included 
as hours worked . It is not necessary that an employee be permitted to 
leave the premises during a meal period , so long as he or she is otherwise 
completely freed from duties. 
Minimum Wage Provisions . Every covered, non-exempt employee is 
entitled to a minimum wage of not less than $3.35 per hour for every hour 
worked . An employee may be paid on a weekly, monthly, or some other 
basis.  If an employee is paid on a weekly basis but works fluctuating hours,  
compl iance with the minimum wage requirements wi l l  be determined by 
dividing the weekly wage by the number of hours worked in a particu lar 
week.  
Deductions. Deductions made from wages for such items as cash 
shortages may not reduce the wages of employees below the minimum 
wage or cut into overtime compensation required by the FLSA. Likewise, 
deductions made from wages to fund mandatory retirement and insurance 
plans cannot reduce the wages of an employee below the minimum wage.  
I f  an insurance or retirement plan is completely voluntary on the part of the 
employee, then the deductions can be made regard less of the fact that 
such deduction wi l l  reduce the wage to below the required minimum hourly 
wage. 
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Overtime. The FLSA requires that overtime must be paid for hours worked 
over 40 in a week. This requirement may not be waived by any agreement 
between the employer and employees. An announcement by the employer 
that no overtime work will be permitted, or that overtime work will not be 
paid for unless authorized in advance, will not limit the employer's l iability for 
the overtime work which the employer ·suffers or permits" employees to 
work over 40 hours per week. The FLSA generally requires that municipal 
employees who work overtime be paid time and one-half for all hours in 
excess of 40 by their employer. 
Compensatory Time. Employees of a municipality may receive, in lieu of 
overtime compensation , compensatory time (comp time) off at a rate not 
less than one and one-half hours for each hour of overtime pursuant to an 
agreement or understanding . The regular practice in effect on April 1 5 , 
1986, with respect to comp time shall constitute the understanding and 
remain in effect (in noncollective bargaining situations) . New employees 
should be given notice of the practice. The employer can use a 
combination of comp time and wages so long as the time-and-a-half 
requirement is met. 
There are l imits to the amount of comp time which may accrue or be 
"bankedll• After the maximum number of hours has accrued, the employee 
must be paid overtime compensation. 
Payment for Comp Time. If compensation is paid to an employee for 
accrued comp time, such compensation is paid at the regular rate earned 
by the employee at the time the employee receives such payment. An 
employee who has accrued comp time upon termination of employment is 
paid the greater of: 
( 1 )  the average regular rate the employee received during the last 3 
years,  or 
(2) the final regular rate of pay received by the employee. 
Limitations on the Use of Camp TIme. An employee who has requested 
the use of accrued comp time must be permrtted to use such time within a 
reasonable period after making the request, if the use does not unduly 
disrupt the operations of the municipality. 
Calculating Overtime Pay. Overtime pay is calculated by multiplying the 
employee's "regular rate of pay" by one and one-half times the number of 
overtime hours worked. The regular rate is defined as the rate per hour 
paid for normal non-overtime work. In cases in which the employee is paid 
on a weekly basis, the regular rate is determined by dividing the weekly 
salary by the number of hours in the employee's regular workweek. 
Payments which are not part of the regular rate include reimbursement for 
expenses incurred on the employer's behalf, premium payments for 
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overtime work and the premium portion that is not less than time and 
one-half the regular rate paid for work on Saturdays, Sundays, and 
holidays ;  and payments for occasional periods when no work is performed 
due to vacation,  hol idays, or i l lness . 
The FLSA does not require employers to pay employees on an hourly rate 
basis. Their earnings may be determined on a daily rate,  sa lary, 
commission, or some other basis, but in such case the overtime pay due 
must be computed on the basis of the hourly rate derived from such 
earnings. The regular hourly rate of pay of an employee is determined by 
dividing the total remuneration for employment (except the statutory 
exclusions) in any workweek by the total number of hours actually worked 
in the workweek.  
I f  an employee is  employed solely on the basis of a single hourly rate, the 
hourly rate is the "regu lar rate". For overtime hours, the employees must be 
paid , in  addition to the straight-time hourly earnings, a sum determined by 
multiplying one-half the hourly rate by the number of hours worked over 40 
in the week. If, for example, the hourly rate is $4 and an employee works 
46 hours in a week, the employee would be entitled to receive $ 1 96 ( 46 
hours at $4 plus 6 hours at $2) , or stated another way, 40 hours time $4 
plus 6 hours times $6 (time and one-half) . 
If an employee is employed solely on a weekly salary basis, the regu lar 
hourly rate of pay is computed by dividing the salary by the number of 
hours which the salary is intended to compensate . For example , if an 
employee is h ired at a salary of $ 1 64 .50 and if it is understood that this 
salary is compensation for a regu lar workweek of 35 hours, or $4.70 an 
hour, when overtime is worked the employee is entitled to receive $4.70 for 
each of the -first 40 hours and $7.05 (time and one-half) for each hour 
thereafter. If an employee is hired at a salary of $ 1 64 for a 40 hour  week 
the regu lar rate is $4. 1 0  an hour. 
Where the salary covers a period longer than workweek, such as a month , 
it must be reduced to its workweek equivalent. A month ly salary can be 
converted to its equivalent weekly wage by multiplying by 1 2  (the number 
of months) and dividing by 52 (the number of weeks) . A semi-monthly 
salary is converted to its equivalent weekly wage by multiplying by 24 and 
dividing by 52. 
Fixed Salary for Fluctuating Hours. The FLSA authorizes the payment 
of a fixed salary for fluctuating hours .  The fixed salary can cover hours in 
excess of 40 hours a week, provided the employee has a clear 
understanding that the salary constitutes straight-time pay for a l l  hours 
worked and the straight-time pay is equa l to or exceeds the requi red 
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour. 
The regu lar rate of an employee whose hours of work -fluctuate from week 
to week, who is paid a fixed salary with the clear understanding that the 
salary constitutes straight-time pay for all hours worked , whatever their 
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number and whether few or many, will vary from week to week. The regular 
rate is obtained for each week by dividing the fixed salary by the number of 
hours worked in that week, but cannot, of course, fall below the required 
minimum hourly wage in any week. Since straight-time compensation has 
already been paid for all hours worked through the fixed salary, the 
employee is entitled to receive overtime pay for each hour worked over 40 
in the workweek at a rate of not less than one-half this straight-time 
compensation. 
A fixed salary for a regular workweek longer than 40 hours does not 
discharge the statutory obl igation of an employer to pay overtime. For 
example, an employee may be hired to work a 44-hour workweek for a 
weekly salary of $200. I n  this instance the regu lar rate is obtained by 
dividing the $200 straight-time salary by 44 hours, which results in a regu lar 
rate of pay of $4.55. The erTlployee is then due additional overtime 
computed by multiplying the 4 overtime hours by one-half the regular rate 
of pay ($4.475) or $9. 1 0. 
Determination of the Applicable Workweek or Work Period .  For regular 
employees, the maximum number of al lowable hours which may be worked 
before overtime must be paid is 40 hours per workweek. The workweek, 
as defined by the FLSA, is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 1 68 
hours or seven consecutive 24-hour periods. The workweek need not 
coincide with the calendar week but may begin on any day and at any hour 
of the day.  A single workweek may be establ ished for al l  employees, or 
d ifferent workweek is establ ished , i t  rema.ins fixed , but may be changed if 
the change is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the 
overtime requirements of the FLSA. 
The FLSA requires a single workweek as its standard and does not permit 
averaging of hours over two or more weeks. For example , an employee 
who works 30 hours one week and 50 hours the next must receive overtime 
pay for the hours worked beyond 40 in the second week , even though the 
average number of hours worked in the two weeks is 40 . This is true 
regardless of whether the employee works on a standard or swingshift 
schedule and regardless of whether payment is made on a dai ly, weekly, 
bi-weekly, monthly, or other basis .  
Occasional or Sporadic Employment. If a municipal employee 
undertakes, on an occasional or sporadic basis and solely at the 
employee's option , part-time employment for the rTlunicipal ity in a different 
capacity than the employee's regu lar employment, hours worked in 
performing the d ifferent employment do not have to count toward 
calculation of overtime hours.  
Swapping Time. I f  a municipality's employees agree, with the approval of 
the municipal official supervising said employees,  but solely at the option of 
the employees, to swap scheduled work hours in the same job capacity , the 
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hours worked as a substitute do not have to be counted for the calculation 
of overtime hours. Employers do not have to keep records of the 
substituted work. 
Records. There are certain recordkeeping provisions of the FLSA. Each 
municipal official responsible for personnel and payrol l  records should 
check to ascertain that al l the information required is contained in the 
records. Municipal officials must keep records of wages, hours, and other 
conditions and practices of errlployment involving his or her employees 
under the Fair  Labor Standards Act.5 These records should be kept in the 
office which acts as the employer. All interested parties have a duty under 
federal law to comply with the rules and regulations under the FLSA. 
Enforcement and Penalties. Employers who wil lfu l ly violate the minimum 
wage or overtime provisions of the FLSA may be fined up to $ 1 0,000, and 
if the employer has been convicted on a prior occasion, may also be 
imprisoned up to six months. Also, when an employee sues for violation of 
the minimum wage or overtime provisions, the employer may have to pay 
the unpaid minimum wage or overtime, as well as an equal amount for 
l iquidated damages, attorney's fees, costs, and other rel ief, such as 
promotions and reinstatement. The U .S. Department of Labor may also 






Memphis Publ ishing Co . v. City of Memphis, 5 1 3  S.W. 2d 51 1 (Tenn. 1 974) ; Bi lbrey 
v. Burgess, Tenn. App. ,  Mid. Section, April 1 ,  1 977. 
Smith County Educ. Association v. Anderson, 676 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1 984) .  
Garcia V. San Antonio Transit Authority, 1 05 U .S .  2061 (1 985) . 
29 C. F. R .  Part 553 ; Federal Register 1 3402-1 3421 (April 1 8, 1 986) . 
Attorney General's Opinion 85-1 64 dated May 1 7, 1 985. 
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The University of Tennessee does not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, color, 
religion, national origin, age, handicap, or veteran status in provision of educational 
opportunities or employment opportunities and benefits. 
The University does not discriminate on the basis of sex or handicap In the 
education programs and activities which it operates, pursuant to the requirements 
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1 972, Pub.L 92-31 8; and Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1 973, Pub.L 93-1 1 2; respectively. This policy extends 
to both employment by and admission to the University. 
Inquiries concerning Title IX and Section 504 should be directed to Ms. Mary H. 
Taylor, Assistant to the Vice President, 109 Student Services and Administration 
Building, Knoxville, Tennessee 37996-021 2, (61 5)974-6622. Charges of violation 
of the above policy should also be directed to Ms. Taylor. 
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE 
In 1 97 1 ,  the UT Board of Trustees created the Institute for Public Service (IPS) to coordinate and 
promote public service activities throughout the University system, excluding services provided through the 
Institute of Agriculture. 
The basic goal of the university public service effort continues to be to bring to the citizens of 
Tennessee-their business, their industry, and their government-the problem-solving capabilities uniquely 
embodied within their statewide university system. 
Public service includes all services offered to those outside the University, including teaching in 
certain non-degree situations, technical assistance, and applied research which are conducted specifically 
at the request and for the benefit of non-University organizations in Tennessee. 
IPS provides ( 1 )  a systemwide focal point for urban and public service, (2) a means to coordinate the 
various system-level public service activities, and (3) an organizational base for communication and 
program development that relates to both outside service clientele of the University and the campuses of the 
University system. 
The operating units of the Institute and their dates of creation are: Center for Government Training 
( 1 967), Center for Indu strial Services ( 1 963),  County Technical Assistance Service ( 1 973), Municipal 
Technical Advisory Service ( 1 949), and Center for Telecommunications and Video ( 1989). 
